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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
MEMBERS OF THE UTAH STATE MOTEL ASSOCIATION, through RALPH
D. HOWE, their President,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

TI-lE STATE 0 F UTAH, through its TAX
COMMISSION, consisting of ORVILLE GUNTHER, Chairman; ALLAN M. LIPTON, ARIAS G. BELNAP, and HERBERT F. SMART,

Case No.
9201

Defendants.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an action contesting the constitutionality of certain
additions to Section 59-15-4 (The Sales Tax Law) which were
passed by the 1959 legislature. These additions are as follows:
(e) A tax equivalent to 2% of the amount paid or
charged for all services for repairs or renovations of
tangible personal property, or for installation of tan3
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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gible personal property rendered in connection with
other tangible personal property.
(f) A tax equivalent to 2% of the amou~t paid or
charo-ed for tourist home, hotel, motel or tratler Court
acco~modations and services; provided that this subsection shall not apply to the amount paid or charged
for tourist home, motel, hotel or trailer court where
residency is maintained continuously under the terms
of a lease or similar agreement for a period of not less
than thirty days.
(g) A tax equivalent to 2% of the amount paid or
charged for laundry and dry cleaning services.
It was the contention of the plaintiffs in the District Court
that paragraph (f) is in violation of the 14th amendment of
the Constitution of the United States and Article I, Section 24
of the Constitution of Utah, each of which guarantees equal
protection of the law to all persons.
The appellants, who are members of the Utah State Motel
Association, filed its action in the District Court of Salt Lake
County on the cons_titutionality of said act and prayed that the
defendant, State Tax Commission, be restrained from enforcing its provision against them. In response the State Tax
Commission moved for a dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint.
After hearing arguments and the submission of briefs, the
Honorable lvfaurice Harding, sitting as judge of the District
Court of Salt Lake County, rendered a memorandum decision
dismissing the action on the ground that the complaint fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. It is from
that decision this appeal is taken.
May it be pointed out that appellants do not dispute the
rule that acts of legislatures are presumed to be constitutional

4
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unless shown to be otherwise. On the other hand appellants do
dispute the right of the trial judge to deprive them of the
privilege of offering evidence for the purpose of proving that
the act is unconstitutional as was done in the instant case.
Neither is it disputed that the legislature may classify business
for taxation and other purposes, provided that such classifications include all competitive businesses within the field covered
by the classification.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
CLASSIFICATIONS CANNOT BE DISCRIMINATORY
OR ARBITRARY.
Decisions involving an interpretation of the 14th amendment of the Constitution of the United States are so numerous
and in most matters uniform that reference will be made herein
to only a few of them.
It is universally held that classifications for business or
other purposes made by legislatures of the various states must
not be discriminatory, capricious or arbitrary. This rule ts
clearly stated in 12 A. Jur. 128 Paragraph 469, as follows:
Page 129. ((It has been repeatedly said that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws means that no
person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of the laws which is enjoyed by other persons or
other classes in like circumstances, in their lives, liberty, and property, and in pursuit of happiness. It has
frequently been stated that tthe equal protection of the
laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.' One
court has added the concept that it means equality of
5
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opportunity to all in like ci~cumstances. T?e guidin~
principle most often stated _by the courts ts that thts
constitutional guaranty requtred that all persons_ ~hall
be treated alike under like circumstances and condtttons,
both in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities
imposed."
On page 147 of the same volume of Am. Jur. it is
stated that,
((One of the essential requirements as to classification,
in order that it may not violate the constitutional guaranty as to equal protection of the laws, is that the classification must not be capricious or arbitrary, but is based
on some natural principle of public policy.

''The rttle is well settled that atbitrary selection can
never be justified by calling it classification. This is forbidden by the equal protection demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment.''
Page 151: t(It is frequently difficult to determine
whether a particular classification is reasonable or. unreasonable, and no definite rule has or can be laid down
whereby this may be determined. The legislature cannot
arbitrarily create a class, however, and when thus created make it binding on the courts so that they would
be bound to accept such classification as a proper one."
The above principle has been upheld by the United
States Supreme Court as well as the highest courts
in most of the States.
In the case of Hartford S.B.l. & Ins. Co. vs. Harrison,
301 U.S. 459, 81 L.Ed. 1223, the Supreme Court of the
U. S. passed on the constitutionality under the 14th
atn~ndment of a law enacted by the Georgia Legislature
a dtfferent bur?en upon stock tns_urance con1 panies than
upon mutual tnsurance companies under classification
legislations. In finding the act unconstitutional the
court stated:
6
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"The applicable principle in respect to classification has often been announced. It will suffice to quote
a paragraph from Louisville Gas & E. Co. vs. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37, 38, 72 L. Ed. 770, 773, 774,
48 S. Ct. 423.
(It may be said generally that the equal protection
clause means that the rights of all persons must rest
upon the same rule under similar circumstances ...
and that it applies to the exercise of all of the powers
of the state which can affect the individual or his
property, including the power of taxation.'
Later the court added, ((Discriminations are not
to be supported by mere fanciful conjecture.--- They
cannot stand'' as reasonable if they offend the plain
standards of common sense.
In Frost tJS. Corp. Corn. of Oklahoma, 278 U.S. 515,
73 L.Ed 483, the same Court held as follows:
((The purpose of the clause in respect of equal protection of the laws is to rest the rights of all persons
upon the same rule under similar circumstances."
In applying that rule to the case before it the court
stated, ((Stripped of all immaterial distinctions and
reduced to its ultimate effect, the proviso as here
construed and applied, baldly creates one rule for
a natural person and a different and contrary one for
an artificial person, notwithstanding the fact that
both are doing the same business with the general
public and to the same end, namely, that of reaping
profits. That is to say, it produces a classification
which subjects one to the burden of showing a public
necessity for his business, from which it relieves the
other, and is essentially arbitrary, because based upon
no real or substantial differences having reasonable
relations to the subject dealt with by the legislature."
In reversing the Supreme Court of Arkansas in
the case of Power !Vldf. Co. vs. Harvey Sanders,
7
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274 U.S. 490, L. ed. 1167, the court held: that in
order for a classification to be legal under the 14th
amendment ((the classification must rest on differences perti~ent to the subject in respect of which
the classification is made."

In Louisville Gas & El. Co. vs. Coleman, 277 U.S.
39, 72 L. ed. 770, it was held that a law imposing
a tax for recording mortgages wherein the debt is
secured matured within five years while imposing
no such tax for recording mortgages where the debt
matures after five years was improper classification
and therefore unconstitutional. In its discussion the
court stated, ((In the first place it may be said generally that the equal protection clause means that the
rights of all persons must rest upon the same rule
under similar circumstances - - - the classification
must be reasonable not arbitrary, and must rest upon
some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so
that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be
treated like."
The courts, both Federal and State, so unanimously follow
the above stated rules that it seems unnecessary to make further
citations.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT
BEFORE HEARING EVIDENCE REGARDING THE REASONABLENESS OF THE CLASSIFICATION.
In their complaint the plaintiffs alleged as follows:
Para. 6 Sub Sec. 2: nSaid statute denies some operators of
motels, hotels, tour.ist homes and trailer courts of the equal
8
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protection of the laws applying to other operators of similar
businesses.''
If that allegation could have been proved by evidence, then
it follows that the legislation in question was discriminatory
and therefore unconstitutional. Certainly plaintiffs should have
been given an opportunity to offer evidence showing that the
act imposes a burden upon some while exempting others who
\Vere competitors in the same business, and that the legislature
had arbitrarily created a classification which is discriminatory,
unreasonable, unjust and therefore unconstitutional. Without
such evidence the court was in no position to pass upon the
constitutionality of the act. In fact in its decision the court
stated: nTh ere may well be slight inequities in the operation
of the statute, but perfection is not required." As to whether
such inequalities were slight or great could not possibly be
determined without evidence. Certainly the appellants were
entitled to present evidence in the matter. Without such
evidence the Court was in no position to make the ruling it did.
POINT III
THE CLASSIFICATION COMPLAINED OF WAS
ARBITRARY AND DISCRIMINATORY.
The legislature in enacting paragraph ttf" of the sales tax
law, apparently intended that tourists should be taxed on their
rentals while in the state while permanent citizens should be
exempted. The constitutionality of the provision in question
must, therefore, depend on whether all of the tourist rentals
or short term rental business of the state are being handled
by the operations included in the classification, namely: tourist

9
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homes, hotels, motels, and trailer camps. If the answer to that
question is in the negative, it follows as a matter of law that
t~1e classification is discriminatory and in violation of the 14th
a~-nendment, for the courts will not permit a discriminatory
ciassification.
lt is well known in this state that there are many other
S!J~~~~jses

oliering rental accommodations to tourists and others
'·)n a daily or weekly basis which are not included within the
classification. For example, in most of the communities of the
state, apartment houses offer accommodations on a weekly
basis, particularly during the tourist season. To require a motel
or hotel to collect a sales tax and exempt an apartment house
from doing so is the rankest kind of discrimination. In various
parts of the state transient workmen are offered temporary
employment on road building and reclamation projects. If
these workers live in a motel or hotel for less than a month,
they must pay a sales tax, but if they occupy a housekeeping
room in a private residence or in an apartment house on a
daily or weekly basis they are required to pay no tax. In such
cases a tax of two or three dollars over a two or three week
period gives a distinct competitive advantage to the unclassified
competition.
Within the state are numerous guest houses, dude ranches,
resorts, and rooming houses which offer rental accommodations
for periods of less than one month, none of whom are included
within the classification complained of and none of whom need
collect a sales tax. Certainly it is obvious that such a situation
is highly discriminatory and unjust.

10
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POIN1. IV
THE LA \Y/ REQUIRES THAT ALL BUSINESSES FALLING WITHIN THE SAME CLASS BE TREATED ALIKE.
The Supreme Courts of two states have passed upon the
constitutionality of sales tax laws on rentals and each of them
has confirmed the principle that such legislation must include
within the classifictaion all business falling within the same
class.
WHITE vs. 1\tlOOREJ 46 P.2nd 1077 (Arizona)

This is a case wherein two points unrelated to the instant
case were decided, namely whether the receiver of an insolvent
bank which rents buildings must collect sales taxes on rentals
even though sol vent banks must do so; and whether the language nor any other business or occupation charging storage
fees or rents" included business properties when the classification intended by the legislature to apply only to residential
property. Neither of these points apply to the issue before this
court.
The Arizona act as quoted by the court in its decision imposed a 2% sales tax ((upon every person engaged or continuing
within this state in the following businesses:
2. Hotels, guest houses, dude ranches, and resorts, rooming houses, apartment houses, automotive rental services, automobile storage garages, parking lots, tourist camps, or any
other business or occupation charging storage fees or rents
''

In that case, the constitutionality of the above classification
was attacked on the grounds that it did not include business
11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

property rentals. The court rightly held that the legislature
had a right under the 14th amendment to classify businesses
renting residential property without including renters of business property within the classification. In this connection the
Court held:
C(It must be kept in mind that a privilege tax is not
a tax on property but a tax on the right to engage in
business and that the Legislature may impose it on any
class or classes of business it cares to and decline to
apply it to others, its only limitation in this respect
being that the classification it makes must be reasonable
not arbitrary or discriminating and such- that all those
falling within the same class will be treated alike.))
Plaintiffs agree that the above is a correct statement of the
law.
The Arizona act listed hotel, guest houses, dude ranches,
resorts, rooming houses, and apartment houses as coming within
the classifictaion and then included the phrase ttor any other
business or occupation charging storage or rents." That language included within the classification every business renting
residential property whether on a day, week or monthly basis.
This the legislature had a right to do for it treated all such
businesses alike, and discriminated against no one.
If the legislature of Utah had done likewise, this action
would not have been .filed. But it did not so act. Instead it
selected four of a dozen or more types of renters of residential
properties on less than a monthly basis, each of which are
in competition with the other and imposes the duty of collecting
a sales tax on the four while allowing the remaining competitors to rent their property without collecting such a tax from
12
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their tenants. Such action is discriminating, arbitrary, and unjust for it fails to treat all those falling within the class of
renting to the traveling public alike, and is therefore in violation
of the equal protection amendment to the Constitution.
There is no saving clause which includes all businesses
within the classification in the Utah law as there is in the
Arizona statute. Instead the Utah law limits the responsibility
of collecting and imposing the tax on tourist homes, hotels,
motels, and trailer camps and permits every other person
engaged in the same class of business to go free from that
responsibility. In Arizona every renter of property for residential purposes is included in the classification, while in Utah
many who are engaged in the same type of business such as
those who offer for rent apartments on a weekly basis, housekeeping units, dude ranches units, boarding houses, private
residence rooms and other competitive businesses in the same
field of activity are exempt from such responsibilities. Under
the Arizona law an owner of a residence, an apartment house
in an area where road or reclamation projects are being constructed, who offers temporary accommodations to the workmen thereon, must collect the same tax from their tenants as
does the motel or hotel operator within the vicinity; while in
Utah every one of those competitors of the hotel and motel
operator in the same area are free from such impositions. To
say to a moter operator in a town for instance where a temporary road building project is underway, ((You must collect
a tax from every workman who resides in your motel, but the
operator of an apartment house next door or the renter of
rooms in a private residence, each of whom are your competitor for business from those workmen, need collect no tax

13
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from those who rent from them," is discrimination which
destroys the protection afforded by the Constitution.
Until the Utah law is made to include all of the competitive business of hotels, motel, tourist homes, and trailer courts
~-ts JS the case under the Arizona law, the law is arbitrary, dis. :1:1t ·ng; and unfair and is in violation of the federal Con-

GL1ULDEN vs. KIRK, 47 So. 2nd 567 (Florida)
The above named Florida case was decided on issues, each
one of which is unrelated to the one in the instant case. But
in deciding that the Florida tax on motels, etc., was constitutional the court indirectly supported the principle of law discussed above.
Like the Arizona law, the one passed by the Florida Legislature included all businesses renting living quarters. It discriminated against none of them. The language of the statute
1s as follows:
ccIt is hereby declared to be the legislative intent that
every person is exercising a taxable privilege who engages in the business of renting, leasing or letting any
living quarters, sleeping or housekeeping accommodations - - - for the exercise of said privilege a tax is
hereby levied - - - equal to three per cent ( 3%) of
and on the total of rental charge - - - ."
This statute includes everyone operating within the same
field of business. No one is excluded from the operation of
the law. Such a classification is constitutional for the same
reason that the Arizona statute is constitutional.

14
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It is because the Utah statute does not include everyone
within the class of such businesses that the Utah act is invalid.
POINT V
IS CLASSIFICATION IN THE INSTANT CASE REASONABLE?
The only remaining question seems to be whether it is
reasonable and fair on the one hand or arbitrary and discriminating on the other for the Utah Legislature to single out
tourist homes, motels, hotels, and trailer courts and place them
in a classification requiring the collection of a sales tax, while
exempting their competitors who are carrying on similar business and offering accommodations to the same class of people
in tnany instances under different designations. It is undisputable for instance that an apartment house offering accommodations on a weeki y basis is in the same business as a motel
which does likewise, So likewise are private residences who
offer temporary housing to workmen, or sportsmen, or visitors
attending carnivals or church conferences, etc., in the same
business as hotels and motels. In fact, as pointed out previously
in this brief, there are a number of businesses in competition
with the ones which the legislature has classified who are
placed in an advantageous position through the enactment of
the legislation objected to.
In Utah the tourist business is seasonal, confined primarily
to summer months. Operators of motels must rely on patronage from local citizens who cannot be classified as tourists
in order to survive through the many off-tourist months. The
legislation in question will give their competitors who are free

15
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from collecting sales taxes from short term tenants great advantages during those periods.
There is no basis for such discrimination under the 14th
amendment. If the legislature had taxed tourist trade and
made a classification of every business offering accommodations
to tourists, such a classification may have been justifiable. But
to require motel operators to collect a tax not only from tourists
but also from non-tourists who rent their accommodations
and who provide for them a substantial portion of their annual
revenue without imposing a similar responsibility on the many
other competitive businesses who do not deal with tourists
but do compete with motels for local trade, is unjust, unfair,
arbitrary and discriminatory. Certainly it is not the kind of
legislation which treats all persons alike under like circumstances and conditions as the courts require. There is no fair
and reasonable difference between those engaged in offering
living accommodations on a daily or temporary basis to both
tourists and non-tourists, to justify a classification of part of
them and excluding from the classification the others.
In Gaulder vs. Kirk, 47 So. 2nd 567, the Court stressed the
generally accepted principle that HCourts should ahvays give
words in the statutes and constitutional provisions the meaning
accorded them in common usage unless a different connotation
is expressed in or necessarily implied from the context of the
statute or constitutional provision in which they appear."
Applying that principle to the instant case, the vlords
((tourist homes, hotels, trailer courts, motels," have very distinct meanings in their common usage. They could not possibly be reasonably interpreted, nor are they interpreted by

16
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the Tax Commission to include within their tneaning apartment houses offering accorr1modations on weekly basis, or
housekeeping apartments operating by the week, or private
residences offering temporary accommodations to workmen,
conference visitors, etc., or dude ranches, or any other business
which is competing with hotels, motels, tourist homes, or trailer
camps for non-tourist as well as tourist trade, none of which
are included within the provisions of the act.
CONCLUSION
If the legislative classification had been set up to cover
all those serving tourists and the tax levied only on them, as
against those serving local citizens who are temporarily away
from their homes; or all those offering housekeeping services
as against those who do not; or some other classification which
included all businesses offering accommodations to people
away from home, there might have been reasonable justification
for the classification. But to arbitrarily select four businesses
from a dozen similar businesses of the same nature, each competing with the other, and imposing a burden upon the four
which need not be borne by the others, is legally arbitrary,
discriminating and unjust legislation which violates the equal
protection amendment of the Federal Constitution, and departs
widely from the fundamental doctrine universally adopted by
the courts of a free land nthat all those within the same class
shall be treated alike," White vs Moore} 47 P .2nd, 181 (5-6).
Respectfully submitted,
HERBERT B. MAW

Attorney for Appellants
17
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

